On March 13, 2025, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf took office as the new African Union Commission (AUC) Chairperson, the AU's chief executive officer and legal representative, following his election at the 38th AU summit in mid-February. His election provides an opportunity for member states and AU organs to assess the record of the regional body in protecting and promoting human rights across the continent under his predecessor, Moussa Faki Mahamat, and take urgent action to better address key human rights issues.  

In 2025, Angolan President Joao Lourenco is taking the rotating role of AU Chairperson, tasked with addressing peace and security across the continent, among other issues. While the Angolan presidency announced that it would cease its mediation work in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo on March 24, Lourenco should center human rights protection in other regional peace efforts as AU Chairperson.

This policy brief draws on Human Rights Watch research and engagement with the AU, notably during Mahamat's second term from 2021 to 2025. Considering the proliferation of armed conflicts in Africa, with devastating consequences for civilians, the policy brief focuses primarily on civilian protection issues. It sets out policy recommendations to AU organs to urgently address grave violations and abuses of international humanitarian and human rights law in conflicts in Burkina Faso, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and Sudan.  

The brief also covers issues across the continent related to the AU's 2025 theme of reparations to address the ongoing impacts of historical crimes, as well as the defense of civil and political rights. 

Failure of the AU to Prevent Atrocities and Protect Civilians in Conflicts  

Warring parties in ongoing conflicts in Burkina Faso, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and Sudan have committed serious violations and abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law. These conflicts are fueled by the near total impunity for abuses that have caused immense suffering to civilians. The AU has failed to address these crises with decisive action to protect civilians.  

The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) established new mechanisms to tackle the Sudan crisis, including with a view to ensuring accountability, which are yet to yield significant results. In addition, it has given too little attention to the other extremely worrying crises in the Sahel, the Horn, and the Great Lakes regions. 

Sudan 

Over 12 million people are internally displaced while around 24.6 million face acute food insecurity since the armed conflict in the country between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied militias broke out two years ago in April 2023. This has created the world's biggest current humanitarian catastrophe. Famine is present in at least five areas in Sudan, including in North Darfur's Zamzam camp and parts of the Western Nuba Mountains, and is expected to spread to other parts of the country according to the UN.  

Human Rights Watch has extensively documented violations and abuses by all parties throughout the conflict. The RSF and allies have committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, including widespread killings, sexual violence, and targeting of civilian property, some of which constitute war crimes. In addition, the RSF and allied militias committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in a campaign of ethnic cleansing in West Darfur. The SAF has indiscriminately bombed populated areas, committed acts of sexual violence, summary executions, and tortured detainees. Both parties willfully obstructed aid - in violation of their obligations under international humanitarian law. 

Human Rights Watch has called for the AU to deploy an UN-backed civilian protection mission under article 4(h) of the AU's constitutive act, allowing it to intervene in a member state "in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity." 

Despite efforts to take the lead on the international response to the crisis in Sudan, the AU has fallen far short, including by failing to follow through on its own commitments. 

Shortly after hostilities began in April 2023, then-AUC Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat convened a high-level meeting, which resulted in the creation of the Expanded Mechanism for the crisis in Sudan, a common platform that includes non-African countries and international organizations. 

On May 27, 2023, the PSC adopted a Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan, with the stated aims of securing a ceasefire, ensuring the protection of civilians, and promoting respect for international human rights and humanitarian law. The roadmap stated that the Expanded Mechanism on Sudan "should monitor the conduct of hostilities and draw the attention of the Parties to acts that breach [international humanitarian law], with a view, at the minimum, to preventing further violations."  

The Expanded Mechanism has yet to publicly report on its monitoring activities which, if any at all, have failed to deter ongoing atrocities. In addition, despite identifying civilian protection as a pilar of the Roadmap, the PSC did not include concrete measures to protect civilians. 

In May 2024, the PSC requested the previously establishedHigh-Level Panel on Sudanto collaborate with the AU special envoy for the prevention of genocide, H.E. Adama Dieng, to develop a strategy to stop atrocities and protect civilians.In June, the PSC reiterated this request and further requested the AUC to set up a committee of five heads of state to facilitate engagement between the warring parties. It also requested the AUC, in coordination with the ACHPR, to investigate and make recommendations to protect civilians. 

In September, the PSC repeated commitments to "exploring practical measures to ensure protection of all Sudanese civilians," without defining a timeline for implementing its proposals nor following up on previous requests to the High-Level Panel on civilian protection.  

In October, PSC representatives undertook a visit to Port Sudan during which they raised international law violations and "emphasized the importance of ... protection of civilians" but did not take any tangible step in that direction.  

While Sudan was on the PSC's agenda at the 38th AU Summit, AU leaders focused largely on the AUC chairperson election and failed to take any meaningful decision aimed at protecting civilians or deterring abuses.  

At its latest meeting on Sudan, on March 11, 2025, the PSC took no significant further action to address the situation.  

As of today, the High-Level Panel has yet to present its civilian protection strategy as requested by the PSC, if any, and the Committee of five heads of state created in June, whose first meeting in October 2024 was canceled, took no concrete decision.  

While encouraging, the AU's initial steps and renewed public condemnations of grave abuses in Sudan, including during the October annual joint PSC and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting, have not translated into tangible measures to protect civilians. Yet, atrocities, including sexual and gender-based violence, are persisting in a context of near total impunity in Sudan. 

The ACHPR is yet to share recommendations to protect civilians as requested by the PSC. According to members of the joint fact-finding mission on Sudan, established by the ACHPR in August 2024, the mission has faced challenges in carrying out its investigative mandate into rights abuses and violations, including because of a lack of financial resources, lack of consent from the Sudanese authorities to access Sudan, and the reluctance of neighboring countries' to grant the mission access. Members of the mission had said during a press conference on January 20, 2025, that they would start their investigative work remotely if they did not get access to Sudan or its neighboring countries.  

Recommendations: 

Burkina Faso 

Burkina Faso's human rights situation significantly deteriorated throughout 2024. Islamist armed groups increased deadly attacks against civilians while government security forces and allied militias perpetrated gross human rights violations in counterinsurgency operations, including crimes against humanity.  

Islamist armed groups control large swathes of territory in Burkina Faso and carry out attacks in neighboring countries. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), an estimated 6,000 civilians died in conflict-related violence between January and August 2024 alone. ACLED and Human Rights Watch documentation, however, only captured a fraction of the violence against civilians, as insecurity and government restrictions on independent scrutiny result in underreporting.  

The military authorities have relied heavily on abusive militias to counter attacks from Islamist armed groups. In October 2022, the government began acampaign to bolster these militias by recruiting 50,000 civilian auxiliaries, called Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (Volontaires pour la defense de la patrie, VDPs). This strategy has placed civilians at the center of violence. It further exacerbated tensions between ethnic communities while Islamist armed groups targeted civilians in communities that have created VDPs. In March 2025, extensive video footage and witness accounts collected by Human Rights watch revealed that pro-government militias have been implicated in a massacre of Fuani civilians in and around the western city of Solenzo.  

The AU has not taken decisive action to protect civilians in Burkina Faso and appears to have bought into the authorities' claims that they have been respecting international human rights and humanitarian law and are improving the country's security situation.  

From July 22 to 27, 2023, members of the PSC conducted a field mission to Burkina Faso, including to assess the security situation. The PSC's mission report notes systematic attacks by Islamist armed groups against civilians in the country but does not explicitly cite abuses by state forces and allied militias. It further mentions that the government has established human rights compliance measures within military forces. 

In the August 2023 communique that followed its mission to Burkina Faso, the PSC commended the authorities for "improving [the] security situation through fighting against terrorism." However, Human Rights Watch has documented an upsurge in Islamist armed groups' atrocities, which have escalated their assault on civilians from 2023 through 2024. Abuses by security forces and allied militias have also persisted. 

The PSC mission report also flagged restrictions on civic space, urging the authorities to lift a ban on political parties' activities to ensure an inclusive political transition. 

In April 2024, the PSC commended the convening of the High-Level African Counter-Terrorism Meeting, which highlighted the urgent need to tackle terrorism in the Sahel. In October, during their annual joint meeting, both the UNSC and the PSC underscored "the need for accountability for any violations" and the importance of "enhancing good governance and human rights" to prevent the spread of terrorism in the Sahel. This affirmation that impunity does indeed constitute a key driver for abuses across the Sahel is important, and makes it imperative that the PSC takes concrete action to press for accountability and enhance human rights in the region. 

In 2023, the ACHPR called on the Burkinab authorities toopen an investigationinto the November 2023 mass killings of civilians in Zaongo. The ACHPR requested the authorities to provide an update on investigations into serious international crimes and raised allegations of other abuses during Burkina Faso's state reporting review in October 2024.  

The AU mandated a Mali-based mission to implement its strategy on the Sahel and monitor the human rights situation in the region, including in Burkina Faso.  

Burkina Faso effectively left ECOWAS in early 2025, eliminating the possibility for its nationals to seek justice through the regional body's court. 

In March, the AU's envoy for the prevention of mass atrocities, Adama Dieng, described the massacre of civilians in Solenzo as "a flagrant violation of human rights." No other AU or international body has publicly reacted on the atrocities. 

Recommendations: 

Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo  

From 2021 through 2025, the M23 armed group, supported by the Rwandan military, has pursued its offensive in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo against Congolese security forces and an allied coalition of abusive militias called "Wazalendo" (Swahili for "patriots"). All parties to the conflict have carried out serious international humanitarian law violations, with grave consequences for civilians.  

In 2024, Rwandan forces and M23 fighters indiscriminately shelled displacement camps and other densely populated areas near Goma, North Kivu's capital. The Congolese army placed artillery positions and other military objectives close to the camps, putting civilians at unnecessary risk. Both sides perpetrated abuse against camp residents, including sexual violence.  

In renewed fighting in 2025, the M23 and Rwandan forces captured Goma on January 27, and Bukavu, South Kivu's capital, on February 16, heightening the risk faced by civilians and critically increasing humanitarian needs. In North and South Kivu provinces, M23 fighters have raided homes, made death threats, and threatened reprisals, undermining independent media and the work of civil society groups. M23 fighters have also detained civil society leaders and committed summary executions. 

Human Rights Watch has called on the Rwandan forces and the M23 to ensure that civilians in eastern Congo, including displaced people, are not denied access to items essential for their survival.  

The AU-backed Nairobi and Luanda Processes 

The AU continually relied on subregional initiatives to address the crisis in eastern Congo, including the Nairobi and Luanda processes, under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), respectively.  

Both initiatives were launched in 2022, with similar ambitions to put an end to hostilities through diplomatic avenues. They have focused mainly on mediation, with no tangible measures to protect civilians despite persisting conflict-related abuses, and stalled without yielding significant results. 

The EAC-led Nairobi process was established during an April 2022 meeting between heads of state of the regional body. It includes a political track focusing on facilitating dialogue between warring parties, and a military aspect, which resulted in the deployment of troops "to help contain local and foreign armed groups" in November 2022. The EAC eventually withdrew its troops in December 2023. Tensions between Kenya and Congo and other issues have stalled the Nairobi process.  

The Luanda process, aimed to mediate discussions between the Congolese and Rwandan governments, was established in the context of the ICGLR roadmap on the pacification process in the eastern region of the DRC (known as the Luanda roadmap) adopted in Luanda, Angola, on July 6, 2022, under the mediation of Angolan President Joao Lourenco. The process led to a ceasefire agreement in July 2024, but it was soon violated, months before a proposed meeting in December between President Paul Kagame and President Felix Tshisekedi was called off. Angola has since withdrawn from mediation efforts in the conflict.  

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has also carried out efforts to address the crisis in eastern Congo, including deploying troops in support of the Congolese army in December 2023. The UN also maintains a peacekeeping presence in eastern Congo. 

Other regional initiatives include the Quadripartite Summit of the EAC, ICGLR, SADC, and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), with UN participation, which the AU held in Luanda on June 27, 2023. The summit is said to have stemmed from the "need for a harmonized and coordinated approach [...] to address the various security threats facing the Great Lakes Region." Representatives from both Congolese and Rwandan governments participated. Participants adopted a joint framework aimed at coordinating existing peace initiatives "with a clear division of responsibilities and agreed timelines," including creating a core group to foster information sharing and reporting to the PSC on a quarterly basis.  

Chiefs of Defense from the participating organizations' member states, Congo, and Rwanda convened in October 2023 as requested at the Quadripartite summit to further coordinate military activities in eastern Congo. No other Quadripartite Summit has been convened since then, whereas the deployment of several forces in eastern Congo calls for continued coordination of military activities, including ahead of the UN peacekeeping mission's withdrawal requested by Congolese authorities.  

The AU, including the PSC, has not explicitly called out abuses by all warring parties. In addition, it is yet to explicitly denounce Rwanda's direct support to the abusive M23 armed group, despite clear evidence. Other partners of Rwanda have publicly called out its clear involvement with the M23 and some have adopted sanctions.  

Regional Responses since Renewed Fighting in 2025 

The renewed hostilities in late January prompted condemnation from the AUC. On January 28, the PSC also condemned the "heinous attacks by the M23" in its capture of Goma, and "any foreign military support being provided to M23 and any other armed group," thus persisting in its unwillingness to explicitly name Rwanda's support to the M23. The PSC mandated the AUC to immediately carry out a fact-finding mission to assess the situation. 

The PSC also stated that "those concerned [in heinous attacks] will be held accountable for their actions" but it neither identified clear accountability avenues nor took any tangible steps in that direction. Impunity for abuses has been a key driver for ongoing cycles of abuses in Congo. 

On February 8, EAC and SADC leaders met during a joint summit in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and decided to merge the Luanda and Nairobi processes. The summit did not address abuses committed by all parties and did not call out Rwanda's support to the M23. 

At the 38th AU Summit, African leaders did not take decisive action on eastern Congo and further failed to explicitly condemn Rwanda's backing to the M23. Members of the PSC met at the heads of state level on February 14 but still took no strong decision to address the crisis. They did not follow up on previous announcements to carry out a fact-finding mission, disregarding steps requested by civil society. AU leaders, however, endorsed the merging of the Nairobi and Luanda processes. 

On March 13, SADC announced the phased withdrawal of its troops, but reaffirmed its commitment to supporting peace in Congo. 

On March 17, EAC and SADC ministers of defense agreed on a roadmap detailing measures to achieve peace in eastern DRC. On March 24, EAC and SADC leaders held a second joint summit directing the implementation of the roadmap and appointed five former presidents as members of a panel tasked with facilitating talks between Rwanda and Congo. The panel met for the first time on April 5, mainly to discuss the implementation of the roadmap. 

On March 24, the Angolan presidency also announced ending its mediation role with regard to the conflict in eastern Congo, to focus on other priorities set up as part of their AU chairperson mandate.  

The ACHPR has raised alarmabout the situation facing civilians, including internally displaced people, and exhorted the Congolese government to put an end to impunity for all perpetrators of "acts of violence." The human rights body is however yet to take strong action to address conflict-related abuses in eastern Congo, including investigating abuses and rights violations by all parties.Its statement following the M23's Goma capture denounced abuses by non-state actors but was silent on Congolese and Rwandan forces' responsibility for abuses. 

Recommendations: 

Ethiopia 

In Ethiopia's northern Tigray region, the two-year conflict between the federal government and allied forces, including Eritrean forces, against Tigrayan fighters, resulted in widespread and serious violations, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. In November 2022, warring parties signed an AU-led cessation of hostilities agreement that effectively ended active hostilities in the region. The warring parties have, however, continued to carry out abuses after signing the truce. 

The AU established a monitoring mechanism to oversee the agreement. The AU's efforts focused mainly on the disarmament of Tigrayan fighters, did not include gender or human rights monitors, and failed to provide regular, comprehensive public reporting on persistent violations in Tigray. In Western Tigray, authorities and Amhara regional forces and militias known as Fanohavecontinued an ethnic cleansing campaign and forcibly expelled Tigrayans while Eritrean forces carried out killings,sexual violence,abductions, and impeded the work of AU monitors.  

The AUC's celebration of the anniversary of the agreement in March 2024 was thus hasty in the face of continued abuses. 

The November 2022 agreement outlined measures to implement the Ethiopian government's commitment to create a transitional justice policy aimed at "accountability, truth, redress, reconciliation, and healing." Since then, the Ethiopian authorities have gradually weakened international involvement in the transitional justice process and shrunk the national civic space. This curtailed opportunities for objective scrutiny into the process, and to assess the transitional justice policy's compliance with regional standards, including the AU's transitional justice framework. It is unclear if the process will ensure the prosecution of perpetrators of grave abuses during the conflict in fair trials. 

The ACHPR prematurely terminated the mandate of its Commission of Inquiry on Tigray, established in May 2021 to investigate violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in Tigray and identify perpetrators for accountability purposes. The Commission never published a report of its findings and recommendations despite some two years of work, setting a dangerous precedent for other ACHPR-mandated investigations. 

The PSC has still not paid enough attention to other conflict-affected areas in Ethiopia, including in the Amhara region, where armed conflict broke out between Ethiopian government forces and Fano militia in August 2023 and is ongoing. The UN, human rights groups, and the media have reported on war crimes in Amhara, including unlawful attacks on civilians, summary killings, unlawful drone strikes, attacks on and unlawful use of civilian infrastructure such as hospitals and schools, and mass arrests without due process. Fighting persists in the region and has triggered a human rights and humanitarian crisis in Amhara and the country more broadly, yet few of Ethiopia's regional and international partners have responded or weighed in on the situation.  

Recommendations: 

Inability of the AU to Fully Uphold Civil and Political Rights 

Under Mahamat's second term and throughout 2024, authorities in several African countries undermined the rule of law and respect for civil and political rights, including during elections. Several governments have shown growing aversion to dissent and have worked to eliminate independent scrutiny into their rights record and abuses, restricting the lawful activities of real or perceived critics, with mixed reaction from the AU. 

In 2024, civil society members, peaceful protesters, political opponents, and journalists have faced brutal crackdowns, including killings, abductions, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary detentions at least in Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, DR Congo, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Security forces have used excessive force to disperse peaceful protests, at times killing demonstrators or bystanders, including in Guinea, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Uganda.  

Governments in Eswatini, the Central African Republic, Rwanda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe used the judiciary to bring politically motivated cases against the opposition and independent civil society. Authorities have also enacted laws or taken administrative measures to restrict the lawful activities of critics. Governments suspended prominent rights organizations and parties in Cameroon, Ethiopia, and Mali, while authorities in Angola, Burkina Faso, and Niger adopted security-related laws that did not comply with international standards and pose a risk to basic freedoms.  

Those seeking to independently denounce abuses or question government policies continue to face dire repression in Africa, in violation of regional norms and standards. Governments have used both legal and illegal means to target critics, with detrimental consequences for democratic engagement on the continent overall. 

In 2024, the ACHPR indicated that enforced disappearances remain "a major concern" in Africa and investigated cases of alleged extrajudicial executions in the context of security or law enforcement operations. It flagged individual cases of targeted critics, denounced pervasive impunity for abuses facing human rights defenders, and requested authorities of concerned countries to conduct investigations into alleged abuses. Its requests have met with limited results.  

Outbreaks of violence linked to mass protests prompted condemnation from the AUC chairperson, including in the context of protests in Kenya and Mozambique. While such high-level AU condemnations are important, the AU should go further and follow up with authorities to ensure those implicated in abuses are prosecuted in credible and impartial trials. 

Elections in Chad, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Tanzania were conducted in environments widely viewed as neither free nor fair, with authorities severely restricting opponents, media, and voters' rights. Military juntas that obtained power through coups in countries whose AU membership was subsequently withdrawn, including in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger, did not transition to civilian rule and instead further entrenched their hold on power. 

The AU's response to unfair elections and military coups has been underwhelming, often failing to appropriately address related abuses or press juntas to return to civilian rule promptly.  

For instance, on July 23, 2024, the AUC chairperson congratulated Rwandan authorities for the "conduct of the elections judged to be peaceful, transparent, free and fair" despite their crackdown ahead of the polls. During a July 2024 meeting on a report from the AU Commission on Elections in Africa, the PSC "congratulated" states for "successfully" organizing elections, including Chad. Human Rights Watch found, however, that violence marred the electoral process in the country, including the killing of civilians by security forces who celebrated Mahamat Idriss Deby's victory by shooting their weapons randomly across urban areas. The PSC further reiterated the "AU's total rejection of unconstitutional changes of government," without naming any specific country or taking any strong decisions to press coup leaders to return to civilian rule besides the usual cursory calls. 

In May 2024, the PSC held a meeting on political transitions in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger where it expressed concern over "shrinking political and civic spaces." It called on the authorities to return to civilian rule based on their roadmaps, but failed to comment on the lack of transparency surrounding the processes that established roadmaps, including exclusion of civil society.  

Recommendations: 

Reparations: Centering Victims of Historical Crimes and their Descendants  

Upon deciding its 2025 annual theme of "Justice for Africans and People of African Descent through Reparations," the AU stated that it expected to "build a common and united front for the cause of justice [...] and reparations to Africans," both on the continent and in the diaspora, for historical crimes and mass atrocities, including transatlantic-enslavement, colonialism, and apartheid. The stated objectives of the theme include: 

Through this theme, the AU seeks to coordinate different initiatives from its organs to advance reparatory justice, raising hope that the AU and its member states will shift the dynamic of how the ongoing impacts of historical wrongs and their profound and ongoing legacies are currently addressed. Until now, affected communities in Africa and the diaspora have been the main catalysts of any reparations efforts to seek accountability from the governments of European countries responsible for abuses during colonization and their legacies. European governments' refusal to recognize a right to reparations for abuses with continuing impact has resulted in few meaningful processes, which have excluded communities. 

Human Rights Watch documented how, over 50 years ago, the Indigenous peoples of the Chagos archipelago wereforcibly displaced from their islands by the United Kingdom, with support from the United States. The two governments have since then denied them the right to return to live on the Islands, which constitutes an ongoing colonial crime against humanity.  

The Mauritius government is currently negotiating a treaty with the UK on the status of the Chagos Islands. In October 2024, the AUC chairperson commended the apparent decision to grant Mauritius sovereignty over the islands, which it described as a "major victory for the cause of Decolonization." The AUC chairperson however failed to mention the imperative of the meaningful participation of the Chagossian people or their right to reparations, including to return to their homeland.  

In its 2024 and 2023 reports, the ACHPR's Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities and Minorities in Africa did not mention the Chagossians. 

In the lead up to its 38th Summit, the AU had indicated that reparations included a wide range of initiatives aimed at addressing past wrongdoings, including financial reparations and land restitution, raising hope that the AU will lend its weight to ensure the Chagossians can permanently return to their homeland in addition to receiving full compensation for the loss and harm they have endured. 

Recommendations : 

The AU's common position on reparations:  

Applying the AU's common position on reparations to the Chagossian people: 

Source: Human Rights Watch